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CAPTURE / FIG-LEAF RISK -- empirical override base rate of commitment rules
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Purpose: GROUND the capture objection in data, not defend against it.

A. FISCAL RULES (IMF Fiscal Rules Database, 1985-2024)
    90%  Deficit-rule breach, 2020 (COVID crisis)
    60%  Debt-rule non-compliance, advanced econ, 2014-2019 (normal times)
    40%  Debt-rule non-compliance, EMDEs, 2014-2019
    40%  Deficit-rule breach, EMDEs, 2014-2019 (normal times)
    20%  Deficit-rule breach, advanced econ, 2014-2019
    67%  Fiscal rules with built-in escape clauses by 2024

B. CENTRAL-BANK INDEPENDENCE (closer monetary analogue)
    38%  Governor transitions politically motivated, 2000-2024 (all)
    50%  Governor transitions politically motivated, emerging markets
    25%  CBI legislative reforms that REVERSED independence, 1950-2023

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READING (honest):
 The fig-leaf risk is NOT hypothetical. Formal monetary/fiscal commitment
 rules are overridden, suspended, or reversed at high and measurable rates:
  - in CRISIS, override is near-universal (~90% breached deficit rules in 2020);
  - even in NORMAL times, 20-60% non-compliance is typical;
  - ~38% of central-bank leadership changes are politically motivated, ~50%
    in emerging markets; ~25% of CBI reforms walk independence BACK;
  - overrides are persistent and hard to reverse, and escape clauses are
    increasingly built INTO the rules (two-thirds by 2024).

 CONCLUSION: the objection is empirically correct. A written issuance rule
 should be expected to face override pressure, and historically comparable
 rules yield to it often, especially under crisis -- exactly the mechanism
 the objection names. This is a REAL, substantial risk, not a solved one.
