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BREAK-EVEN DISPLACEMENT delta (routing-correct: delta applies to dividend lane)
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Tolerance: price impulse < 1%.  2024 issuance $584B, M^T ~$6258B

            mode (kappa_d)  break-even delta                        meaning
           floor-max (0.0)              0.00   no goods exposure -> neutral
Mode B floor-weighted (0.4)              0.73         needs 73% displacement
Mode D pure dividend (1.0)              0.89         needs 89% displacement

Price impulse vs delta, by mode:
    delta   Mode B (kd=.4)   Mode D (kd=1)
     1.00           0.00%          0.00%
     0.80           0.75%          1.87%
     0.60           1.49%          3.73%
     0.40           2.24%          5.60%
     0.20           2.99%          7.47%
     0.00           3.73%          9.33%

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HONEST VERDICT
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 - In Mode D (pure dividend), the framework needs delta >= 89% displacement
   to keep inflation under 1%. The empirical literature says displacement is
   PARTIAL and rarely that high -- and near-zero in slack -- so the pure-dividend
   operating point CANNOT rely on displacement for neutrality. Mode D's neutrality
   comes from issuance being growth-MATCHED (capped at realized growth), NOT from
   displacing bank credit; the displacement question is a SECOND-ORDER inflation
   risk on top, and it is real.

 - In Mode B (floor-weighted), only 40% of issuance reaches the goods lane, so the
   break-even displacement drops to 73%, and the price impulse is
   correspondingly smaller across the whole delta range. Floor-weighting is the
   structural mitigant -- the more the budget routes to the asset-buying floor, the
   less the displacement question matters for goods inflation.

 - The Chartalist bear case (delta ~ 0, injection fully additive) is the worst: it
   makes the dividend net-new spending power and the impulse large. We cannot rule
   it out from data; it is the honest downside and it argues for floor-weighting
   and for keeping the dividend modest.

 BOTTOM LINE: the double-claim concern is REAL and the neutrality of a large cash
 dividend is NOT guaranteed by displacement -- displacement is partial, state-
 dependent, and unmeasured for money creation. The framework's actual defense is
 (a) growth-matched issuance caps the quantity, and (b) floor-weighting keeps most
 issuance out of the goods circuit entirely. Relying on credit displacement to
 neutralize a big dividend would be the weakest version of the argument; the data
 does not support it. This strengthens the case for floor-weighting and a modest
 dividend, and it concedes that a pure-dividend Mode D carries a genuine, bounded
 inflation risk from the un-displaced share.

